Regulating Multiple Externalities: The Case of Nordic Fisheries

Staffan Waldo, Frank Jensen, Max Nielsen, Hans Ellefsen, Jónas Hallgrimsson, Cecilia Hammarlund, Øystein Hermansen, John Isaksen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)


Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)233-257
Number of pages25
JournalMarine Resource Economics
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2016


  • Climate change
  • economic efficiency
  • externalities
  • fisheries
  • fuel efficiency
  • regulation


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